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JURISDICTION
J urisdiction is pr opei :i i i 1:1 id s : • on 11: t pi ir suai it t : 1 Jtc 1 I C : i =
A n n , sec t i on. 78 - 2 2 ( 1) and 78 - 2 a - 3 (2) (k) .
ISSUES
1.

PRESENTED

Wnether a rlose : :\.-.

property J A I ^ : •
iT-nrrri'"

+

. . atioi ishi p bet/w een the

:t:;dar\ by acquiescence case creates a
-

nrries

greater weight as to, nonacquiescence

. . ^^aui -

2.

W h e t h e r the d i s t r i c t court i m p r o p e r l y found that the

ownei: s of the tw ::> ]:: :i : c perti es prior to 1 967 niutua] ] 3 acquiesced in
the a. 1 t i f i c i a 1 boundary?
3.

W h e t h e r the d i s t r i c t courr. i m p r o p e r l y found that the

t w o p r op e 1: t: :i e s
boundary

.

•

* ) r o p e 2: ]

1 1 de d 11 1 a t

ac--;..- e s s e n c e h a d b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d , w h e r e the t w o

p r o p e r t i e s are n;t a d j o i n i n g a c c o r d i n g to m o d e r n

contemporary

A p p e l l e e xt-t r~*- contest the s t a t e m e n t of the i s s u e s a s
presented by appellor

,ellee does contest whether issues 1

com*. . aii'.i whether r -iey were properly auckeled.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

A ; p>:-. . .

'Brief of appellant ,u,

.
-eview 01 a ;ria. court''-: conclusions

of law are based 01 1 a correction of error standard, granting no
deference 1: : • til: 1 = ti :i a ] c • : n 11 : t:

Marcl lai it v , I ai k (Z'li t ,/,, ) ; ] I • 2d

677, 680 (Utah App, ] 989), aff'd, 788 P 2d 520 (Utah 1990); Lake
1

Philcras v. Valley Bank and Trust Company, 845 P.2d 951, 955 (Utah
App. 1993).
2.

Appellant's second issue on appeal attacks a factual

finding of the trial court.

(Brief of appellant at 2)

Appellate

courts reviewing a trial court's findings of fact apply a clearly
erroneous standard, and will not lightly disturb those findings.
Alta Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993) .
An appellant attacking a factual determination has an obligation
to marshal the evidence in support of the determination made by
the finder of fact, then demonstrate why it is deficient.
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799, 800
(Utah 1991); Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993).
3.

Appellant's third issue on appeal mixes a challenge of

a finding of fact and a conclusion of law.

Appellate review of

findings of fact applies a clearly erroneous standard.

Alta

Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993); Von
Hake v. Thomas 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985) . An appellant
attacking a factual determination must marshal the evidence in
support of the determination made by the finder of fact, then
demonstrate why it is deficient.

Crookston v. Fire Insurance

Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799, 800 (Utah 1991) .

Legal conclusions

are based on a correction of error standard. Jacobs v. Hafen, 917
P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1994).

2

DETERMINATIVE

AUTHORITY

T h e r e a.re no coi i s t i L u t Loiidl p t o v J r» i unii,

,sl d'luLes ni i'iuJk\- ul

central importance, to this appeal.
/r Ikih

STATEMENT
A

uASE

- ture oi ..::•._ ~as-_ . . .. . s case in vn 1 ve s own e r L- :: _;. f

real property locate-i in American Fork, Uta*
t : -': •' • :<
B.

defend~" *

. -le.Iant claims

^cur iarv '••• r-|uiescence.

Statement oi: r'a^ .

.

.. property present.; ^n

dispute between :. ;\.e ;. arties was once

part c: a larger parcel cf

p r o p e i: t: y o v n 1 e a ID } A n a i: e w i i J i i e")

t : < 11

:5 i i

s i \ ,;

i i :i i : s \ t ft 11 a r e w

Pulley conveyed approximately one acre of the proper ty to hi s s o n
Adolphus Pulley,
al]

(R at 310)

•

Pullc.

In 1946, Andrew Pulley conveyed

^'operty !:: : 1 :i :i s da/i lghter defendan t Mary

.'he p r o p e r L ; was deeded to defendant Mary Pulley

the fallowing leoa:

using

:escription:

beginning ^- L.II-« ^enter of sectiw^
^ ,^. . ,,, .^A-IIL...
south, Range 2 east, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; cnence
•• ir 27.15 chains; thence south 85 56' west 6.18 chains;
Liience north 4.58 chains; thence west 3.28 chains; thence
north 2,50 chains; thence west 4.0C chains; thence north
^.0 0 chains; thence east 2 5,00 chains; thence south 6.50
chains; thence east 15.00 chains; thence south 20.00 chains
to place of beginning. Area 75.85 acres more or less. (R.
ar 31C- 3 0 9
The property carved out of the larger Andrew Pulley parcel
and ccnveypi re Ado'rhus Fu; \*-*\ by his father andrew w a s
des<

-•

.

I! -

, i.u it;.-DU chains North of the Southwest corner of the
-west quarter of Section 1 8 , Township 5 south, Range 2
L of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 2.50
cnains East 4,0 J chains; thence south 2,50 chains; thence
wes*- 1 :n -:h'-a::v *-~ *-u~ ^ n c e of begi nn :i ng. Area ] 0 acres.
3

Plaintiff eventually came to purchase the 1 acre parcel
originally conveyed to Adolphus Pulley.

Defendant Mary Pulley

eventually transferred much of her property received from her
father Andrew, but retained the portion which abuts plaintiff's
property.

(R. at 240)

Because the legal descriptions of Mary

Pulley's parcel and plaintiff's parcel commenced from different
starting points, there is a description gap between the
properties.

(R. at 0412-0415)

None of the remaining property

has been deeded to other parties.

(R. at 0416)

Despite the

description gap, plaintiff possesses the amount of property which
Adolphus Pulley originally deeded to Andrew Pulley.

(R. at 0416-

0418)
Adolphus Pulley held the property which he was deeded by his
father until he died.

The property was then held by Thelma

Pulley, Adolphus' wife, until 1967 (R. at 240) . Trees were
planted along the boundary between the properties in
approximately 1944.

(R. at 0468)

(R. at 499)

The area between

the 1940's tree and fence line, and the legal description is the
area in dispute in this matter.

(R. at 308)

In 1967, Thelma Pulley sold her property to Lewis and
Caroline Madsen. (R. at 24 0)

The Madsens conveyed the property

to Charles and Zena Boyer in 1973.

(R. at 240)

the property to Plaintiff in 1979.

Plaintiff and Defendant both

claim ownership of the disputed property.
C.

The Boyers sold

(R. at 17)

Proceedings Below:

Plaintiff filed this action for quiet title and trespass on
4

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes or rules of
central importance to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case: This case involves ownership of

real property located in American Fork, Utah.

Appellant claims

title by deed, defendant by boundary by acquiescence.
B.

Statement of Facts: All of the property presently in

dispute between the parties was once part of a larger parcel of
property owned by Andrew Pulley. (R. at 311-310)

In 1934, Andrew

Pulley conveyed approximately one acre of the property to his son
Adolphus Pulley.

(R. at 310)

In 1946, Andrew Pulley conveyed

all the remainder of his property to his daughter defendant Mary
Pulley.

The property was deeded to defendant Mary Pulley using

the following legal description:
Beginning at the center of section of Section 18, Township 5
south, Range 2 east, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence
west 27.15 chains; thence south 85 56' west 6.18 chains;
thence north 4.58 chains; thence west 3.28 chains; thence
north 2.50 chains; thence west 4.00 chains; thence north
7.00 chains; thence east 25.00 chains; thence south 6.50
chains; thence east 15.00 chains; thence south 20.00 chains
to place of beginning. Area 75.85 acres more or less. (R.
at 310-309)
The property carved out of the larger Andrew Pulley parcel
and conveyed to Adolphus Pulley by his father andrew was
described in that deed as follows:
Beginning 16.50 chains North of the Southwest corner of the
Northwest quarter of Section 18, Township 5 south, Range 2
East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 2.50
chains East 4.00 chains; thence south 2.50 chains; thence
west 4.00 chains to the place of beginning. Area 1.0 acres
3

the court below.

(Brief of appellant at 1)

Plaintiff argues

that this issue was raised implicitly at the trial level.
550-551)

(R. at

(See Appendix III)

Plaintiff's second issue alleges there was no acquiescence
to the boundary between the parties real property prior to 1967.
(Brief of appellant at 2)

Again, plaintiff failed to preserve

this issue in the court below.

And cigain, plaintiff claims to

have preserved the issue implicitly, and
memorandum.

(Brief of Appellant at 2)

(See Appendix III)

also by pre-trial
(R. at 550-551, 102-101)

Examination of the record reveals neither

plaintiff's first or second issue on appeal was ever raised or
preserved in the trial court.

Plaintiff now urges the court to

consider these issues for the first time on appeal.
551, 102-101)

(R. at 550-

(See Appendix III)

Utah law precludes consideration of appellate issues which
were not first raised in the court below.

Because plaintiff's

first two issues were not raised or preserved, they cannot be
considered.

Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc.,

645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982); James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799,
801-02 (Utah App. 1987).
Failing to raise or preserve her first two issues in the
trial court, plaintiff also failed to preserve the issues in her
docketing statement.

Plaintiff did not file an amended docketing

statement, denying defendant the opportunity to file a motion for
summary disposition on the issues which were not docketed.
Rules 9, 10, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure)
6

Issues not

(See

June 21, 1994.

(R. at 3-1)

Defendant/Appellee answered and

filed a counterclaim on August 11, 1994.

(R. at 23-16)

Plaintiff answered the counterclaim on September 8, 1994.
27)

(R. at

Plaintiff filed a summary judgment motion on March 14, 1995.

(R. at 51-50)

The motion was denied on May 5, 1995.

(R. at 120)

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on November 9,
1995, which was denied on January 2, 1996.
275)

(R. at 176-175, 276-

A bench trial was held on March 21, 1996.

(R. at 323-565)

Findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a judgment were entered
for the defendants on May 21, 1996. (R. at 311-303)

Plaintiff

filed this appeal. (R. at 318-317)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This matter is an appeal from a verdict quieting title to
disputed real property in appellee Mary Pulley (hereinafter
defendant), on her counterclaim based on boundary by
acquiescence.

(R. at 316-303)

The appeal in this matter was

filed based solely on appellant's (hereinafter plaintiff) third
issue on appeal, the only issue set forth in the docketing
statement.

(See plaintiff's docketing statement)

Subsequently,

plaintiff filed her brief on appeal which sets forth two
additional issues - - issues which were not set forth in the
docketing statement.
Plaintiff's first appellate issue - - which alleges a
presumption against boundary by acquiescence where adjoining
property owners are related - - was not raised or preserved in
5

1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Because plaintiff failed to

marshal the evidence, the finding of the trial court should be
upheld.
Defendant has marshalled the evidence supporting the finding
of the trial court, and it is apparent that the evidence supports
the trial court finding.

Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage et.

al., 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah App. 1994) . (See Appendix I for
marshalling.)
Plaintiff's final issue on appeal is: "Whether the district
court improperly found that the two properties were adjoining,
and improperly concluded that boundary by acquiescence had been
established, where the two properties are not adjoining according
to legal description."

(Brief of Appellant at 2)

This issue is

a mixed question of fact and law.

The trial court found that the

parties are adjoining landowners.

(R. at 307)

challenge requires marshalling of the evidence.

The factual
Utah Dept. of

Social Services, at 1197. Again, plaintiff has failed to marshal
the evidence so it has been marshalled by defendant Mary Pulley.
(See Appendix II)

Failure to marshal the evidence requires

support of the trial court finding, and corresponding legal
conclusion.

Lake Philgas v. Valley Bank and Trust Company, 845

P.2d 951, 955 (Utah App. 1993), quoting Saunders v. Sharp. 806
P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991).
Because of plaintiff's failure to preserve the first two
issues for appeal, the failure to cite authority for the issues,
the failure to marshal the evidence, and the adequacy of the
8

properly appealed and preserved in a docketing statement, cannot
be considered on appeal.

Dairyland Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut,

Auto Ins. Co., 882 P.2d 1143, 1144 (footnote 1) (Utah 1994).
Assuming arguendo that plaintiff's first issue is properly
before the court, that issue is:

"Whether a close family

relationship between the property owners in a boundary by
acquiescence case creates a presumption of, or carries greater
weight as to, nonacquiescence in the artificial boundary."
Plaintiff cites no authority on point from any jurisdiction
in support of her argument, but instead argues adverse
possession, and prescriptive easement cases by analogy.
of Appellant at 9-10)

(Brief

Plaintiff's argument displays a basic

misunderstanding of the peaceful nature of boundary by
acquiescence, and the hostile nature of adverse possession and
prescriptive easement.

Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah

1990) quoting Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725, 726 (1974);
Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 587 (Utah 1982).

Olwell v.

If anything, the fact that

property owners on opposite sides of a boundary are related
strengthens rather than weakens the likelihood of acquiescence in
a property boundary.
Plaintiff's second issue on appeal is: "Whether the district
court improperly found that the owners of the two properties
prior to 1967 mutually acquiesced in the artificial boundary?"
(Brief of appellant at 2)

This issue is a challenge to a factual

finding of the trial court which requires marshalling of the
evidence.

Utah Department of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d
7

aware that a different standard should be considered.
550-551)

(R. at

(See Appendix III)

Plaintiff also failed to raise or preserve at the trial
level the second issue on appeal.

The issue is: "Whether the

district court improperly found that the owners of the two
properties prior to 1967 mutually acquiesced in the artificial
boundary?"

(Brief of Appellant at P.2)

Plaintiff claims the

issue was raised implicitly at trial and in plaintiff's reply
memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment.
550-551, 102-101)

(See Appendix III)

(R. at

As with the previous issue

on appeal, plaintiff claims to rely on an implicit conclusory
argument of plaintiff's counsel to claim that the issue was
preserved for appeal.
At trial, plaintiff's counsel claimed that there was never
an argument as to who owned the disputed property.

He did not

make any argument that there was not acquiescence in the
boundary.

(R. at 550)

Upon examination of the record it is

evident that the issue was never raised or preserved.
Plaintiff also claims that the argument was preserved in a
reply memorandum filed prior to trial.
p. 2)

(Brief of appellant at

The argument in the reply memorandum could not have

preserved the issue for appeal.

First, the issue which plaintiff

has argued on appeal deals with acquiescence in the boundary
prior to 1967.

(Brief of Appellant at 2)

The argument in

plaintiff's reply memorandum deals exclusively with acquiescence
between plaintiff and the defendant Mary Pulley.
10

(R. at 102-

findings and conclusions of the trial court, plaintiff cannot
prevail on her appeal.

Such glaring deficiencies conclude that

this appeal is frivolous.

Defendant should be awarded her

attorney's fees and costs. (See Rule 33 Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure)
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF FAILED TO RAISE OR PRESERVE IN THE COURT BELOW HER
FIRST TWO ISSUES FOR APPEAL.
Plaintiff in her brief has raised two points for appeal

which were not set forth in her docketing statement, and most
importantly, were not preserved for appeal in the court below.
Plaintiff states the first of these issues as:

"Whether a

close family relationship between the property owners in a
boundary by acquiescence case creates a presumption of, or
carries greater weight as to, nonacquiescence in the artificial
boundary." (Brief of Appellant at 1)

Plaintiff claims that this

issue was raised implicitly at the trial level.
(See Appendix III)

(R. at 550-551)

Examination of the references to the record

cited by plaintiff make it evident that this issue was never
preserved for appeal.

The record at 550-551 contains a portion

of plaintiff's counsel's argument at the conclusion of the trial.
In his argument, Plaintiff's counsel makes no argument whatsoever
that the presumptions regarding family relationships should
change, or that there is a different standard for boundary by
acquiescence where family members are present on opposing sides
of a boundary.

No direct authority is cited in support of the

plaintiff's position, and no effort is made to make the court
9

II.

PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRESERVE HER FIRST TWO ISSUES ON APPEAL
IN HER DOCKETING STATEMENT.
In addition to failing to raise or preserve the first two

issues for appeal in the trial court, plaintiff also failed to
preserve those issues in her docketing statement.

In support of

her failure to docket the issues, plaintiff cites Nelson by and
through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City
1996).

919 P. 2d 568, 572 (Utah

In Nelson, an appellant was allowed to pursue issues on

appeal which were not preserved in the original docketing
statement.

In that case an amended docketing statement was filed

which raised the additional issues.

In the case at bar, there

has been no amended docketing statement filed, and therefore the
issues have not been preserved.

If plaintiff is allowed to

pursue her first two issues on appeal, without raising them in
the docketing statement,

or filing an amended docketing

statement, defendant Mary Pulley will be prejudiced because she
has been denied the opportunity to file a motion for summary
disposition on issues which were not docketed.
of Appellate

(See Utah Rules

Procedure rule 10)

In Dairvland Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut, Auto Ins. Co., 882
P.2d 1143, 1144 (footnote 1) (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court
refused to consider issues on appeal which were not properly
appealed and docketed as follows:
. . . Although the Anopols' counsel raised this argument in
their brief on appeal, they neglected to appeal this issue
by filing a notice of appeal and a docketing statement, and
we therefore decline to consider it. See Utah R. App. P. 3
8c 9.

Because plaintiff's first two issues were not preserved for
12

101)

(See Appendix III)

until 1979.

(R. at 332)

Plaintiff did not purchase her property
There could be no acquiescence between

the parties prior to plaintiff's purchase of her property.

This

argument could not have preserved the issue for appeal.
This court has set forth specific standards for preservation
of issues for appeal.

In LeBaron v. Rebel Enterprises, Inc.,

823 P.2d 479, 482, 483 (Utah App. 1991), this court stated:
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must
timely bring the issue to the attention of the trial court,
thus providing the court an opportunity to rule on the
issue's merits. See Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis
Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982); James v.
Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801-02 (Utah App. 1987). "Issues not
raised in the trial court in timely fashion are deemed
waived, precluding [the appellate court] from considering
their merits on appeal." Salt Lake County v. Carlson,776
P.2d 653, 655 (Utah App. 1989); accord Barson v. E.R. Sguibb
& Sons, Inc.,, 682 P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984); Franklin Fin,
v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983).
Further, the mere mention of an issue in the pleadings, when
no supporting evidence or relevant legal authority is
introduced at trial in support of the claim, is insufficient
to raise an issue at trial and thus insufficient to preserve
the issue for appeal. James, 746 P.2d at 801. This rule is
"'stringently applied when the new theory depends on
controverted factual questions whose relevance thereto was
not made to appear at trial'." Id, (Quoting Bogacki v. Board
of Supervisors, 5 Cal. 3rd 771, 489 P.2d 537, 543-44, 97 Cal
RPTR. 657, 663-64 (1971) cert, denied, 405 U.S. 1030, 92 S.
Ct. 1301 (1972)).
Examination of the record as designated by Plaintiff, (R. at 550551, 102-101) makes it evident that the plaintiff has failed to
preserve the first two issues in her brief for appeal.
issues cannot be considered by the court.
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Those

mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary.

Plaintiff argues

that there should be a presumption against acquiescence where the
parties on the two sides of the disputed boundary are related.
At trial, plaintiff offered no evidence disputing the claim that
the line in question was treated as a boundary during the period
it was owned by Adolphus Pulley and his wife on one side, and
defendant Mary Pulley, or her predecessor in interest on the
other.

The only evidence regarding whether the line was

acquiesced in as a boundary was offered by defendant Mary Pulley.
(R. at 467 to 471, 473 to 477, 486 to 490, 493 to 495, 500 to
504)
Plaintiff cites no authority from Utah or any other
jurisdiction in support of her argument for a higher standard
where persons on opposite sides of a boundary are related.

This

lack of citation occurs because there is no authority in support
of Plaintiff's position.
Because of the lack of authority in boundary by acquiescence
cases, Plaintiff attempts to argue adverse possession and
prescriptive easement cases by analogy.

Such argument

demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the doctrines of
boundary by acquiescence and adverse possession.
Boundary by acquiescence is a peaceful doctrine.

It is

based on the premise that sometime in the fairly distant past,
adjoining property owners implicitly agreed on a boundary.
Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 423 (Utah 1990) the court
stated as follows:
14

In

appeal or docketed, they cannot be considered by the Court.
III. UTAH LAW HAS NO PRESUMPTION OF NONACQUIESCENCE BETWEEN
FAMILY MEMBERS.
Plaintiff's first argument in her brief alleges that a close
family relationship between property owners creates a presumption
of nonacquiescence in a boundary.

(Brief of appellant at 1)

Assuming arguendo that this issue were properly preserved for
appeal, review of a trial court's conclusions of law must be
based on a correction of error standard, granting no deference to
the trial court.

Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 680 (Utah

App. 1989), aff'd, 788 P.2d 520 (Utah 1990); Lake Philaas v.
Valley Bank and Trust Company, 845 P.2d 951, 955 (Utah App.
1993) .
In her brief, plaintiff correctly sets forth the elements of
boundary by acquiescence which when satisfied create a
presumption of ownership of the subject property.
Zane, 848 P.2d 165, 168-169 (Utah App. 1993).

Enqlert v.

Those elements

are:
1.

Occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments,
fences, or buildings.

2.

Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary.

3.

Acquiescence for a period of at least 20 years.

4.

The acquiescence in a boundary must be for a period of
at least 2 0 years.

Jacobs v. Hafen, 9] 7 P.2d 3 078,

1081 (Utah 1996).
In her first argument under point I of her brief, plaintiff
concentrates I

argument on the second element set forth above:
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cooperative, making claims of open, notorious hostile possession
more difficult to prove.

Because families are presumed to get

along and cooperate there is a presumption that they are not
adverse to one another for purposes of adverse possession.

Smith

v. Smith, 511 P.2d 294, 300 (Idaho 1973).
If an analogy can be drawn from the cases cited by
plaintiff, the analogy strengthens the argument that members of a
family would agree on the location of a boundary.
IV.

PLAINTIFF HAS NOT MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE, THEREFORE FACTUAL
DETERMINATIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE BEYOND CHALLENGE.
Plaintiff's second point on appeal asks: "Whether the

district court improperly found that the owners of the two
properties prior to 1967 mutually acquiesced in the artificial
boundary."

(Brief of appellant at p. 2)

Although this issue is

subject to a marshalling standard, plaintiff's brief is an
attempt to retry this matter before the appellate court based on
selected facts set forth by the plaintiff without marshalling the
evidence.

Because the plaintiff is challenging the factual

findings of the trial court, she is held to a marshalling
standard.

Christensen v. Munns 812 P. 2d 69,

72-73 (Utah App.

1991); Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987).
Although she failed to marshal the evidence, plaintiff's
brief makes it evident that she is attempting to revisit the
factual issues of the case rather than examining, as a matter of
16

law, whether the findings of fact contained within the trial
court's findings support the conclusions of law made by the trial
court.

(Brief of Appellant 11-14)

This is why defendant's brief

is full of citations to various parts of the record, and is
barren of case law.
When an appellant is challenging the sufficiency of the
findings of fact of a trial court, a marshalling standard always
applies.

In Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage et. al., 872 P.2d

1051, 1052-1053 (Utah App. 1994) this court stated:
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual
findings lightly. We repeatedly have set forth the heavy
burden appellants must bear when challenging factual
findings. To successfully appeal a trial court's findings
of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate.
"[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from the client's
shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order
to properly discharge the [marshalling] duty ..., the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial
which supports the very findings the appellant resists,"
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315
(Utah App. 1991); accord In re Estate of Bartell. 776 P.2d
885, 886 (Utah 1989); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193
(Utah 1987); Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d
29, 36 (Utah App. 1993); Ohline Corp v. Granite Mill, 849
P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1993). Once appellants have
established every pillar supporting their adversary's
position, they then "must ferret out a fatal flaw in the
evidence" and show why those pillars fail to support the
trial court's findings. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1314.
They must show the trial court's findings are "so lacking in
support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,'
thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Bartell, 776 P.2d at
886 (quoting Walker, 743 P.2d at 193).
Oneida at 1052-1053.
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Because defendant has failed to marshal the evidence, this
court cannot consider any factual issues on appeal.

"If the

evidence is not properly marshalled, we will assume the findings
are supported and proceed to review the accuracy of the lower
court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the
case."

Lake Philgas, at 955, quoting Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P. 2d

198, 199 (Utah 1991) .
Because this issue is based on a marshalling standard, and
plaintiff failed to marshal the evidence, defendant Mary Pulley
has marshalled the evidence on this point.
Evidence Appendix I.)
are as follows:

(See Marshalled

The factual findings of the trial court

(Numbering from original)

6.
Part of Defendant's 75.85 acre property was
immediately north of and adjacent to Plaintiff's
property.
7.
In the 1940s, trees and bushes were planted
and a fence erected along the tree and bush line
between Plaintiff's and Defendant's properties. The
fence/tree line marked the boundary line between the
Plaintiff's property on the north and the Defendant's
property on the south.
8.
From at least 1946 to 1979--some 33 years-Adolphus Pulley and each succeeding owner of the
Plaintiff's property from Adolphus Pulley to Charles
and Xenna Boyer considered and acquiesced to the
fence/tree line as the boundary line between the
Plaintiff's and the Defendant's properties.
9.
From at least 1946 to 1979--some 33 yearsDefendant Mary Pulley considered and acquiesced to the
fence/tree line as the boundary line between the
Plaintiff's and the Defendant's properties.
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10. From 194 6 to present, Defendant Mary Pulley
has occupied, possessed, maintained and cared for the
property immediately north of the fence/tree line.
11. From 1946 to present, Defendant Mary Pulley
has used the property immediately north of the
fence/tree line for family and community events.
12. For at least 33 years prior to Plaintiff's
ownership of her property, the fence/tree line
established the boundary line between the parties'
properties.
13. The fence/tree line between the parties'
properties has been clearly visible since at least
1946.
Upon review of the marshalled evidence, and the findings of
fact of the trial court, it is evident that the owners of the
real property on each side of the disputed boundary acquiesced in
the boundary prior to 1967.

(R. at 315-314)

Upon examining the

marshalled evidence set forth in Appendix I, it is evident that
there is a solid basis in the evidence for each Finding of Fact
set forth above.

Because they are supported by the record, and

because they have not been properly challenged, the findings of
the trial court must stand.
V.

THE PARTIES TO THIS ACTION ARE ADJOINING LANDOWNERS.
Plaintiff's final point on appeal is that boundaiy by

acquiescence is not applicable to the case at bar, as a matter of
law, because there is a description gap evident between the two
properties.

This challenge comes despite the finding by the

trial court that the parties are adjoining property owners.

(R.

at 316-304, 302-299)
To properly challenge the trial court's factual finding,
plaintiff is obligated to marshal the evidence supporting the
trial court's conclusion, then demonstrate why the finding of the
trial court is erroneous.

Christensen v. Munns 812 P.2d 69, 72-

73 (Utah App. 1991); Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah
1987) . Although she is attacking a finding of the trial court,
plaintiff has again failed to marshal the evidence.

(See

argument regarding marshalling requirement in Point IV above);
(R. at 309 - 304, R. at 302-299)

Because the plaintiff again

failed to marshal the evidence, the defendant Mary Pulley has
marshalled the evidence in favor of the findings of the trial
court.

(See Appendix II.)

A close reading of Utah cases demonstrates that when a court
is determining whether parties are adjoining property owners for
purposes of boundary by acquiescence, the primary consideration
is whether the parcels of property are contiguous.

In Staker v.

Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1990) the court stated:
It is clear that the fourth requirement, that there be
adjoining landowners, has been met in this case. Although
the various diagrams and maps before the trial court differ
somewhat, they all reflect that the parcels involved are
contiguous. . . .
Black's Law Dictionary uses the following description for the
term contiguous:
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Contiguous: In close proximity; neighboring; adjoining;
near in succession; in actual close contact; touching at a
point or along a boundary; bounded or traversed by.
In this matter, the court in its findings of fact found that the
parties are adjoining landowners.

The findings of the trial

court fit the above definition very well.

The trial court

specifically found as follows: (Numbering from original)
18. A comparison of the legal descriptions of
Plaintiff's and Defendant's properties shows that the
respective deeds unintentionally created a narrow
description gap between the parties' properties to the
north and east of the Plaintiff's property.
19. The parties' legal descriptions were created
from two different marker points of beginning which
resulted in the description gap.
20. The narrow strip of land creating the
description gap between the parties' properties was an
unintentional and mistaken result of the property
description process.
21. Although surveys and legal descriptions show
a gap between the parties' properties, the gap was
originally part of the Andrew Pulley property which was
subsequently transferred to Defendant Mary Pulley.
22. Upon
Mary Pulley of
Defendant Mary
the north side

Andrew Pulley's transfer to Defendant
his property, Adolphus and his sister
Pulley became adjoining landowners on
of Plaintiff's property.

23. Plaintiff's property and Defendant's property
have been adjoining and are adjoining lots from 1936 to
present.
(R. at 307)
The marshalled evidence by Defendant set forth above, supports
the trial court's finding that the parties are adjoining
21

landowners.

Because the factual findings are fully supported by

the marshalled evidence, and have not been challenged, they must
be upheld.

Having found that the parties are adjoining

landowners, the trial court had no choice but to conclude that
boundary by acquiescence had been proven by defendant.
VI.

DEFENDANT MARY PULLEY IS ENTITLED TO HER COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR DEFENDING AGAINST A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL.
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides as

follows:
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal.
Except in a
first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court
determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these
rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages, which may include single or double costs, as
defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the
prevailing party. The court may order that the damages be
paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions.
For the purposes of these rules, a
frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that
is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or
not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other
paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed
for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless
increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or
other paper.
In the case at bar, Plaintiff's first issue was not
preserved in the trial court or in her docketing statement.
these reasons alone it should not be considered.
and II above.)

(See Points I

Assuming arguendo that the issue was properly

preserved, plaintiff has cited no authority from Utah or any
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For

other jurisdiction directly on point in favor of her argument,
and has argued a presumption which has never existed in Utah law.
(See Brief of Appellant at 7-11)

Instead, plaintiff has argued

the opposite doctrines of adverse possession and prescriptive
easement in an attempt to bolster her case.
Plaintiff's second argument on appeal was not preserved in
the court below or in the docketing statement.
II above.)

(See Points I and

Assuming arguendo that the issue is properly before

this court, it has been argued by incorrectly applying the
standard of review.

(See Brief of Appellant at 11-14)

The

argument is clearly an attack on the factual findings of the
trial court, yet there is no marshalling.

Standing alone,

failure to marshal is sufficient for the court to refuse to
consider an issue.

(See Point IV above)

Instead, plaintiff

attempts to re-litigate the case using citations to the record
which she believes are favorable to her.

Further,

he entire

argument does not contain a single case supporting plaintiff's
position on the issue.

(See Brief of Appellant at I114)

Plaintiff's final argument is an another attack on the
factual findings of the trial court, again with no marshalling of
the evidence.

(See Brief of Appellant at 14-15)

Plai ntiff

ignores the findings of the trial court, arid strains at a unique
interpretation of the "adjoining landowners" requirement of
23

boundary by acquiescence.

Again, plaintiff argues only by

analogy as there are no Utah cases directly on point.
Considering all of the above factors, it is evident that
this appeal is frivolous, and that plaintiff cannot prevail on
the issues she has briefed.

Further, plaintiff's failure to

marshal the evidence as required by the proper standard of review
for the issues she has briefed has required the marshalling to be
done by defendant Mary Pulley.

Responding to issues which were

not raised or preserved below, and marshalling the evidence
because it was not done by plaintiff, has significantly increased
defendant Mary Pulley's attorney's fees and costs for responding
to this appeal.

Defendant should be awarded her costs and

attorney's fees.
In many ways this matter resembles Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d
414, 416-417 (Utah 1990).

In the Hunt case, the plaintiff

pursued an appeal upon which she could not prevail. The court
held that pursuing such an appeal violated Rule 3 3 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The court further held that the

issue of frivolity of the appeal was sufficiently raised in the
appellee's brief.

In Hunt defendant was awarded double costs and

attorney's fees.
Under these facts of this case, it is appropriate that this
matter be considered a frivolous appeal, and that defendant Mary
24

Pulley be awarded double costs and attorney's fees pursuant to
rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants request that the
Court affirm the decision of the trial court and Quiet Title in
Defendant Mary Pulley.

Additionally, because Plaintiff failed to

preserve her first two issues at the trial level, briefed issues
which were not docketed, failed to marshal the evidence, and
failed to cite authority in support of her third points on
appeal, Defendants are entitled to their attorneys fees and costs
based on a frivolous appeal.
DATED this ^j^Jj

day of December, 1997.
FISHER, SCRIBNER & STIRLAND, P.C.

BY

$Jk c*C
T. MCKAY 9QKRLAND
DONALD E. McCANDLESS
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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APPENDIX I

MARSHALLED EVIDENCE
Plaintiff's second issue for appeal deals with whether the
district court improperly found that the owners of the two
properties prior to 1967 mutually acquiesced in the boundary
between the properties.

This issue is a challenge to the factual

findings of the District Court.

Whenever a challenge is made to

factual findings, the party challenging the factual determination
has the obligation to marshal the evidence in favor of the
proposition, then demonstrate why the finding was incorrect.
(Christensen v. Munns 812 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1991) .
Because plaintiff has failed to marshal the evidence,
defendant has marshalled the evidence to demonstrate that the
finding of the trial court should be upheld.

Because the

plaintiff has only challenged one of the elements of boundary by
acquiescence, only facts relevant to that element will be
marshalled.

Further, Plaintiff's challenge to the findings of

fact is only directed to the time period prior to 1967,
therefore, only findings dealing with events prior to 1967 will
be marshalled.
1.

John Pulley who was 97 years old at the time of trial

was the first witness to testify regarding acquiescence during
the time period in question.

(R. at 464.)

Mr. Pulley was born

in an adobe house on the property owned by Defendant Mary Pulley.
1

Mr. Pulley lived on the property from the time Defendant Mary
Pulley's home was built in 1911, until he moved in 1965. (R. at
464, 465)
465)

In 1965, Mr. Pulley moved to a property nearby. (R. at

Mr. Pulley testified about acquiescence in the boundary as

follows:

(Quote from 0467 line 25 to 0471 line 13)

Page 0467 line 25
Q.

Did Adolphus and Mary or Adolphus and your father ever

establish a boundary between their two properties?
A.

Yes, it was established.

At that time I don't know

just where it would be right exactly now, but it was established
at that time.
Q.

What did they use to establish it?

A.

Well, they had trees and --well, there's grass and

trees are just about the main.
Q.

What kind of trees are they?

A.

Juniper.

Q.

Did they ever plant any pine trees along that border?

A.

Well, on the south border where Adolf lived they put a

row along there, yes.
Q.

Did they ever put any trees between Adolphus' property

on the north and Mary's property?
A.

Yes, that was planted into trees along there.

Q.

And were those same trees still there?
2

A.

All except for one, and that blew over here about two

months ago in a windstorm.
Q.

But do you remember about when those trees were

planted?
A.

They was planted in 1944.

Q.

And you lived at the home until the 1960's, correct, at

the old Pulley home?
A.

Yes.

I lived there until I got married, and of course

I moved.
Q.

While you were living there, did you treat those trees

as the boundary between the farm property ad Adolphus' property?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did Adolphus treat that as the boundary line to his

property, also?
A.

Well, yeah, I think so.

I would say it was recognized

as a boundary.
Q.

By whom?

A,

By my father who owned the rest of the farm.

Q.

And did Adolphus also recognize that boundary?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

And did he care for the property up to that boundary

A.

Yes, Adolf took care of that.

line?
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Q.

And did your father and you and the rest of your family

take care of the farm around it?
A.

Of course the farm around it would be all the farm east

of there, yes.
Q.

Who took care of the property between north of

Adolphus' property and south of the home -- your home?
A.

Mary took care of that.

Q.

Was she living in the home at that time?

A.

Yes, at that time.

Q.

Has she lived there all of her life?

A.

Well, until she went on a mission.

Q.

Except for her mission?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

How old is she now?

A.

She's 96 years old.

Q.

And she took care of that piroperty all the way up to

the boundary line by Adolphus'?
A.

That's right.

Q.

How did she take care of it?

A.

Well, to take care of, of course, she had mowing

What did she do?

equipment -- she rode the mower to cut the grass, and she put in
a sprinkling system there to sprinkle the land so it didn't take
so much work to water the trees and that.
4

Q.

Did she take pretty good care of that property?

A.

Absolutely.

Q.

Was the grass usually green?

A.

Yeah, it's always green.

Q.

And she would usually cut the grass?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And how long did she do that for?

A.

Well, she did that up until about six years ago.

Q.

Did you know of any discussion by anybody, or did you

ever observe any boundary dispute between that property and
Adolphus' property?
A.

Well, no.

There's a division of trees, but they are

still there now.
Q.

But you didn't observe any dispute as to the boundary

there?
A.

No.

2.

The second witness regarding the period prior to 1967

was Ron Pulley, a son of Adolphus Pulley, who was one of
Plaintiff's predecessors in interest.

Mr. Pulley lived on the

property now held by Plaintiff from 1943 to 1962, and visited the
property regularly for several years after that.
25 to 0475 line 4)

(R. at 473 line

Mr. Pulley testified about the property line

as follows: (Quote 0475 line 5 through line 22), 0476 line 19
5

through 0477 line 7) (R. at 0484 line 14 through line 25)
Page 0475 Line 5
Q.

While you were living there, was there any division

between your property or your father's property -- your parents'
property and Mary Pulley's property?
A.

Yes, there was.

The division was the tree line, and we

also had a fence that fenced in all the backyard.
Q.

And was there a fence along the north side of your

property?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And between the south end and Mary Pulley's?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

What is your earliest recollection of that fence or

tree line being there?
A.

Well, it was always there.

You know, I asked my father

about it, you know, what was our property and what was Aunt
Mary's property, and that was the dividing 1 ine, that was the
property line.
Page 0476 Line 19
Q.

Was there a fence between your property and Mary

Pulley's property?
A.

Yes, there was.

Q.

And is it in approximately the same place as where the
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fence is located now?
A.

It's exactly the same place.

Q.

When was the last time you were out on the property?

A.

I go there all the time.

It would have been days,

weeks.
Q.

And is the fence that's there now pretty much in the

same spot as it was when you were growing up as a boy?
A.

Yes, the tree line is still there.

Page 0484 Line 14
Q.

When you came home from your mission in 1962 or 1963,

whenever it was, was the fence still there?
A.

It's always been there.

Q.

And was it still there then?

A.

As far as I could--

Q.

Was it still there when you got married?

A.

Yes.

Q.

When did you get married?

A.

In 1965.

Q.

So the fence was there during your lifetime, as far as

you know, from 1943 until 1965?
A.

Yeah, ut's always been there.

7

3.

The next witness was Julie James, a sister of Ron

Pulley, and daughter of Adolphus Pulley.
Plaintiff's property beginning in 1947.

Ms. James resided on
(R. at 0486) (Quote 0486

line 24 through 0490 line 19. 0493 line 22 through 0495 line 7)
Page 0486 Line 24
Q.

Do you have any recollection of a boundary line or a

fence line or a tree line or something between your parents'
property and Mary Pulley's property?
A.

There was always a very definite line on the north and

the south, and it was very definite.
Q.

What did it consist of?

A.

It consisted of pine trees, bushes, always -- usually

flowering bushes, (inaudible) honeysuckle, things like that,
because my mother liked those types of things.

There was some

Chinese Elms.
Q.

This is along the north side?

A.

On the north side.

Q.

Why do you remember those bushed being there?

A.

Because we always had to cut them back when the

overlapped on Mary's lawn.
We all had a love of flowers, and we always loved the
springtime when the flowers would -- you know, because that's why
we had them.

We liked the spring flowers -- you know, they
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always bloomed in the spring and it was very pretty.

Our place

was just covered with flowers all the time.
Q.

What is your earliest recollection of seeing those

flowers bloom along the fence line?

How old would you say you

were?
A.

Well, I can remember having pictures taken when I was

only maybe two and a half, three.

I remember the flowers then.

You know, the bushes were -- when I was small, the
trees were pretty small.
Q.

These are the trees along the north where the fence is?

A.

Uh-huh, but there was a definite line that went back,

and then there was always a fence -- the metal fence with the
posts that went all the way back to the back where we used to
have sheep.

It used to be in grass and then it was a garden

after I was a little older.
Q.

Did your property or your parents' property ever extend

beyond the fence line on the north?
A.

Never.

Q.

Did you or your family ever consider that you owned

property beyond the fence line?
A.

No.

And once you crossed the row of trees you were on

Aunt Mary's property, and then on the south it was the Hawthorne
trees next to the ditch.
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Q.

And so you believed or your knowledge was that was the

area that your family owned?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did Mary care for the property on the north side of the

fence?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What did she do?

A.

She mowed the grass, watered it, and the water lines --

you know, it came from the reservoir, and sometimes she would be
up all night watering and you could always hear the click of the
water heads.

It was just something that was always there.

She

planted flowers.
When I was younger we had --we used to play there all
the time.

I mean we had rock gardens and frog ponds, I mean that

was -- all the cousins, that's what we did, we had frog ponds and
we go hunt frogs. The peacocks and the turkeys and -- I mean it
was just there, that was just Aunt Mary's and this was ours.
Q.

And the fence line and the tree line divided it?

A.

That was a definite line, yes.

Q.

And is that same line there today?

A.

Yes.

Q.

When was the last time you were on the property?

A.

Just a little while ago, just maybe a week ago we were10

Q.

Have you periodically been on the property during your

A.

All the time, because that's just like our home.

life?
I

mean Aunt Mary is our family.
Q.

Has that fence line and tree line been there your whole

A.

Always, my entire life.

Q.

Including today?

A.

Including today.

Q.

And the location of the tree line and the fence line is

life?

the same today as it was when you were growing up?
A.

It is the same.

The trees are bigger, but the fence

line is still there, and it's just there.
Q.

When was it that you left the property?

A.

I was 18 when I got married.

Q.

And the fence line was still there?

A.

And I was there through my whole life, graduated from

high school, got married, and then I moved, but I was there most
of the time anyway.

You go back home, that's your home.

Page 0493 Line 22
Q.

What's your earliest memory of that what you call the

fence line there or the border line there?
A.

How old were you?

As long as I could -- was early enough to remember.
11

Q.

How old would that be?

A.

Two and a half, maybe.

I can remember having my

picture taken, because I was with my brother's dog, Toby.

I can

remember that distinctly.
Q.

How big were the trees then?

A.

Well, say if this was ground level, just little.

You

know, they were not that big, just little.
Q.

And there were bushed there?

A.

There were bushes, they were planted.

bushes that were put in.

There were some

I think they got them from Stole's

Nursery down in American Fork.
Q.

What kind of a fence was it?

A.

A heavy wire fence like you would use on a farm, a farm

fence with T-posts.
Q.

There wasn't amu barbed wire?

A.

We didn't have barbed wire on our fence that I

remember.
Q.

How long did you live there?

A.

Until I was 18.

Q.

Did you ever see them change the fence or fix the fence

I graduated from high school in --

(inaudible) the fence during the time you were there?
A.

Pardon?

Q.

Did you ever see them change the fence or fix the fence
12

while you were there?
A.

It has never changes.

The only time it ever needed to

be fixed is when we -- all us kids would climb over and kind of
mash it down a little bit, and it had to be pulled back up.

4.

The next witness was Wendell Hansen who was born in

Defendant Mary Pulley's home in 1924. (R. at 0496)

He lived

there until 1944, then moved into Plaintiff's home a few years
later where he lived for four more years. (R. at 0497)

Mr.

Hansen now lives on part of the old Pulley farm. (R. at 0497)
Mr. Hansen testified about the boundary between the properties.
(Quote R. at line 2 through 0500 line 11)

(0501 line 12 to 0502

line 20 (0503 line 17 through 0504 line 8)
Page 0499 Line 2
Q.

Was there ever a division between his property and rest

of the farm?
A.

Always was.

Q.

What kind of a division?

A.

There was a fence in the back end and the front end, it

was shrubbery and the trees.
Q.

Did it eventually become a fence between the two

properties?
A.

Yes.
13

Q.

About when was that, do you know?

A.

Probably from about 1950 on.

Q.

Did you ever have occasion to go back and forth between

the two properties?
A.

Yes, I did very much, yes.

Q.

Why would you?

A.

Well, I used to live in the basement, I used to go out

and visit my mother.

In fact, I remember even jumping the fence

in the back end going up to visit my mother.
Q.

How old would you have been then?

A.

I'd have been 22 to 24.

Q.

Did your mother reside with Mary Pulley her whole life?

A.

Yes.

Q.

When you were married was she living there?

A.

When I got married she was living there.

She lived

there until she died.
Q.

From when to when would she have lived there?

A.

Well, she would have lived there from birth until

death.
Q.

So how old was she when she died?

A.

Eighty-three.

Q.

So she lived there 83 years.

A.

Right.
14

Page 0501 Line 12
Q.

Did you ever see Mary care for the property -- her

property that extended to the fence line?
A.

You bet.

Q.

What did you see her do?

A.

She did all the work on what we called her property,

and that was that area between the old Pulley home and Adolphus.
Q.

Right up to the tree line?

A.

Right up to the tree line.

Q.

And the tree line consists of those pine trees that are

there now?
A.

Right.

Actually now there's a combination fence, it's

a wire fence with -- in fact, it's too high now.

She used to

have so much problems with plaintiff's dogs that -- in fact, Aunt
Mary accused her of cutting holes in the fence to let the dogs
through, and that's why she lost all of her birds.

She used to

have guinea hens -- they all got killed off.
They came up and they would get in her garbage and move
the garbage around and then go out and mess all over her lawn,
and there were just -- she did not have good feelings toward
Christine.
Q.

How long has Mary been caring for that area up to the

fence?
15

A.

Ever since it was deeded to her.

Q.

Up until what point in time?

She doesn't still care

for it, does she?
A.

Well, she still supervises.

Now she's mentally

incapacitated, but up until that time, yes, I would say about
until 1994 she took really good care of it.
Q.

Up until about 1994?

A.

Uh-huh.

Page 0503 Line 17
Q.

The fence that's there today and the tree line that's

there today, is that approximately on the same location as the
boundary line that you understood it to be since you were a boy?
A.

I think it's exactly on the boundary line.

Out in

front she used to take -- during when she had her Christmas
display, she used to put a new fence up every year during that
time.

And then it got to the point that people would just keep

kind of driving in —

in fact, a four wheel drive truck come

through there one time and ended up right over in her lot, and it
forced her to put up this chain link fence.

And that was not put

up by the American Fork City, that was put up by Mary Pulley.
Q.

You're talking about the fence along this side?

A.

Right, on the road.
16

APPENDIX I I

MARSHALLING ON PLAINTIFF'S THIRD ISSUE ON APPEAL

Plaintiff's third issue on appeal is "Whether the district
court improperly found that the two properties were adjoining,
and improperly concluded that boundary by acquiescence had been
established, where the two properties are not adjoining according
to legal description."

This issue is at least initially a

challenge of a finding of fact.

Because plaintiff failed to

marshal the evidence on this point, defendants have done so as
follows:
1. Defendant's first witness regarding whether the
properties are adjoining was Brian Allred.

Mr. Allred surveyed

the property, and testified regarding the effect of the various
deeds, the creation of the description gap, and the fact that the
properties were adjoining.

(Quote R. at 0404 line 15 to 0406

line 18) (0408 line 4 to 0416 line 9)
Page 0404 Line 15
Q.

Let me show you another deed that we'd like to submit

for admission.

This is a deed from Andrew Pulley to Adolphus

Pulley, isn't it?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Does it say on there the date?

A,

Yeah, January 9, 1935.

That was the recording date
1

that looks like.
Q.

That was Andrew Pulley to Adolphus Pulley, is that what

it says on there?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And about how much was that, the acreage?

A.

It says one acre, "area 1.00 acre."

Q.

And have you indicated -- did you on this particular

graph, did you -- have you mapped out where that particular plot
of property would be?
A.

The legal description, yes.

Q.

And where would that be?

A.

Well, it extends north of the fence line.

Q.

Would it be right here, this line that I'm tracing with

my finger, that's indicated by the Stokes, the 2 (inaudible) word
"Stokes" up here north?
A.

The solid line with a dot?

Going from the line where it says, "Boley, " the line

north of that up to the line that's north of the fence line.
Q.

And the fence line is indicated by what?

A.

Little x's through the end of the line.

Q.

So that solid line about the Stokes word that has the

little x's?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

So you're saying that this acre deeded to Adolphus by

Andrew is indicated by the dotted line about the word "Boley," to
the dotted line above Stokes?
A.

Yeah, indicated by a long dot, long dot.

Q.

So before any of these divisions now, when Andrew

Pulley received the approximately 84 acres from the
Featherstones, did that include both the Adolphus Pulley or the
Stokes property and the Mary Pulley property where the home is
and the few acres?
A.

Yes, it included them both with the exception of a

little overlap there at the top -- underlap, whatever.
Q.

And so all of this area within the pink was one piece

of property?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

And you've been in the courthouse today, and we've

talked about the disputed piece that the plaintiff is claiming,
we've talked about some property gaps, et cetera?
A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

And this one piece of property includes all of those

areas, correct?
A.

Yes.

Page 0408 Line 4
Q.

The area that's highlighted in blue on this particular
3

exhibit, what does that indicate?
A.

This fence line around the Mary Pulley's property.

Q.

And this at the bottom here above the word, "Stokes,"

os the fence line (inaudible) we've received testimony on today?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Between the Stokes property and the Pulley property?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

And then there is a little blue line down here at the

bottom above the word, "drive."

Is that a fence line also?

A.

It is.

Q.

Then we have another line that's green.

What does that

indicate?
A.

That's the Mary Pulley legal description.

Q.

And then this long dotted line in yellow, what is that?

A.

That's the Stokes legal description.

Q.

And then these other dotted line that aren't colored,

they are just other deeds?
A.

Surrounding deeds, yes.

MR. STIRLAND:

I'd like to offer that into evidence, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Any objection to 7?

MR. LOW: No.
THE COURT:

Very w e l l ,

7 is received.
4

( E x h i b i t No. 7

received into evidence)
THE WITNESS:

I think technically that (inaudible) one at

the north is a right-of-way.
Q.

MR. STIRLAND:

I can't remember now.

That is not at issue.

There's an area

here between the yellow line on this particular exhibit and the
green line.
A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

What is that area?

A.

Description gap.

Q.

Description gap?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Over here on our first exhibit we have here one deed,

and it includes all this property, correct?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

The deed from Featherstone to Andrew Pulley?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

But yet now, looking at the Mary Pulley deed and the

Stokes property, we have a description gap between the two
properties?
A.

Right.

Q.

In an area that was once one property?

A.

Apparently.

Q.

Do you have any idea what would have caused that
5

description gap?
MR. LOW:
how he would know.

Objection, your Honor, foundation first as to
I don't object to his testimony, I just want

to make sure we know how he knows before he (inaudible) .

Q.

THE COURT:

All right, I'll sustain the objection.

MR. STIRLAND:

Let me just lay a little bit of

foundation, okay?
A.

Sure.

Q.

What is your degree, your advanced degree?

Do you have

an advanced degree?
A.

I have a degree in English and one in mechanical

engineering.
Q.

And you're employed as the -- what was it again?

A.

Property survey manager.

Q.

For Daley & Associates?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you're responsible for directing surveys and then

mapping out those -- that information?
A.

I collect the field data and put it on a computer and

then take the legal descriptions and put it on a computer, match
them up and try to determine where the property line should be.
Q.

Do you have any experience or knowledge relating to

gaps in property descriptions or plat maps?
6

A.

Yes, we quite often see them.

Most people think that

it's a legal description, it's cast in iron, and as far as it
goes it is.

But we often see gaps between properties.

Q.

When you say, "we," meaning?

A.

Well, myself and other people that work in the office.

I'm not the only one who puts in things on the computer.
Q.

So by the nature of your employment and the company

that you work for, you've had the opportunity to study legal
descriptions and gaps and how they occur?
A.

Yes.
MR. STIRLAND:
Mr. LOW:

Is that enough?

What's your question going to be?

MR. STIRLAND:

My next question is going to be, "do you

have an opinion as to why there's a gap in this particular area?"
Mr. LOW:

Maybe (inaudible) he's there, and does he

know any history (inaudible).
Q.

MR. STIRLAND:

Are you familiar with particular area of

the maps and plats and the legal descriptions of this area.
A.

Yes.

Q.

We've gone through all the deeds, the Pulley deeds, the

Andrew to Adolphus deed.

We've gone through the Featherstone to

the Andrew Pulley deed, we've gone from the Andrew Pulley deed to
the Mary Pulley deed, correct?
7

A.

Yeah.

Q.

And you've read all those and you've calculated all

those out, correct?
A.

Yeah, from the records and physical things, yeah.

Q.

Could you tell us, in your opinion, why there would be

a gap here between the yellow property and the green property?
A.

I see it quite often.

It's mainly because when they --

this is just based on how evidence stacks up later on, a section
is an ideal entity.

It's supposed to be one mile by one mile.

And when surveyors came out to do the original subdividing into
sections, to take a township and divide it into sections, that's
what they're shooting for.
But for one reason or another, my assumption is
inaccuracies in their instruments, the sections are never ever
exactly one mile by one mile.

Around here I see mostly they are

a little bigger, and so you've got a section that's supposed to
be one mile on each side and it's actually got an additional -well, sometimes it's smaller, but often -- mostly it's bigger
around here, 30 to 70 feet or whatever.
Q.

So typically how would surveyors, when they came into a

township, how would they mark out a section of property?
would they place markers?
A.

Well, yes, they put markers at the corners.
8

I mean,

Q.

And they would measure from that area, typically, from

most points?
A.

Yeah.

And from then on the descriptions refer to the

markers, the monuments, the actual -- now they put in brass
tacks, originally that put in stone mounds.

Our county is very

good at mapping those and recording where they sit in reality to
each other.
Q.

And once in this particular area, the section was

measured and the monuments or the markers were established, then
if there was any activity as far as selling or transferring or
dividing the property, it would refer to those markers, correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

So how is it, then, that we get the gap here, in your

opinion?
A.

Well, as I was saying, the Stokes' property is called

from the west quarter cornered.

Would that be down--

A.

Which is half way between the northwest corner and the

southwest corner -- I mean approximately half.
is.

It is where it

And then the Pulley property is called from the center

section, which is -- well, there is no monument there, you have
to calculate that.
Q.

So you're saying that the legal description for the
9

Pulley deed and the legal description for the Stokes deed, they
didn't start necessarily from the same corners?
A.

Right.

Q.

They started from different corners?

A.

Right.

Q.

And how would that have resulted in a gap, or how would

that affect the legal descriptions?
A.

Well, if the markers are longer than the --

theoretical, I think, for a half of it is 400,200 -- whatever it
is -- it's feet.

If the distance is greater than it is in

theory, and they haven't had a surveyor out there to see and
indicate that, and they are writing it from the theory, then that
would pull them apart -- pull the descriptions apart, because
from a theoretical corner on the other side, in reality they are
further apart then they are supposed to be, and that would pull
them apart.
Q.

Even though they might be adjacent pieces of property,

the legal descriptions started from different corners could
result in the gap?
A.

Yes.

Q.

But it is your testimony that at one time, at least in

1887, that entire area was one piece of property?
A.

By the Featherstone, yes.
10

Q.

Yes, by the Featherstone, Andrew Pulley deed?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

In your review of this area and the legal descriptions,

did you notice any other, or come across any other deeds to
individuals of property in this area except for Andrew to Mary,
Andrew to Adolphus and then Adolphus Pulley to the Madsens and
then the Boyers and then the Stokes and McCrimmons?
A.
2.

No, I didn't notice anybody else involved in that.
The evidence marshalled above regarding mutual

acquiescence would also go to whether the properties are
adjoining.

Because that evidence is marshalled above, it will

not be repeated.

11

APPENDIX III

550 line 8 to 551 line 5:
Well, that's now.

The second requirement is that the mutual

acquiescence in the line as a boundary.
elements of this requirement, too.

Okay, so there's two

There's mutual acquiescence,

and in treating the line as a boundary.
In the mutual acquiescence facet of it, the way I interpret
that -- I think that's appropriate is that they both agree that
that's a boundary, or should be treated as a boundary.
Now for years, I guess, that land was owned by Pulleys on
both sides of it, and it didn't seem to ever become an argument
as to whether who owned what.

But it certainly doesn't match up

to those cases where -- for example, in one case -- this was
proven because the party on one side of the fence tried to buy
the land on the other side of the fence, an so the Court decided,
"Well, that's obviously acquiescing because they thought it was
the other person's land so they tried to buy it."
Well, that didn't happen here.

There's been no admission by

anybody that they did not own that land on the other side.
Again, it was Pulleys on both sides of that land.
R. at 102-101 in pertinent part:
2. There has never been mutual acquiescence in the fence
line boundary.
As stated above, defendant Pulley had knowledge of the true
boundary.

Certainly, Ms. Stokes has known the boundary since

1979, or at worse, 1989.

Ms. Stokes has watered the property and

attempted to build fences on the property.

In addition, Ms.

Stokes has continually paid taxes on the property.

In 1990, as

can be seen by the tax receipts and records, the property was
split for tax purposes.

Ms. Stokes actually pays a separate tax

bill on the disputed property.

The tax bill comes to the

plaintiff's address in the plaintiff's name.
are disputed by the defendants.

None of these facts

There has never been mutual

acquiescence in the fence line as the boundary.
The law requires mutual acquiescence,
side has acquiesced.

In this case, neither

Defendant Pulley effectively used the land

through a lease and is now claiming ownership.

This is improper

and does not meet the requirements of the boundary by
acquiescence doctrine.

The plaintiff has stated that she has

never conceded that the fence line was the boundary.

Therefore,

mutual acquiescence is impossible, and the plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment should be granted.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHRISTINA R. STOKES,
Plaintiff,

: FINDINGS OF FACT AND
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
MARY J.
HANSEN,
FOWLER,
HANSEN,

PULLEY, WENDELL
CAMILLE FOWLER, JIM
TRAVIS HANSEN, TROY
AND REGAN HANSEN,

:
: Civil No. 940400337
(Judge Harding)

Defendants.
This matter came before the Court for a non-jury trial on the
21st day of March, 1996, the Honorable Ray M. Harding, District
Court Judge, presiding.

Plaintiff was present and represented by

Thomas L. Low and Defendants were represented by T. McKay Stirland.
Having heard the evidence presented and counsels' arguments and
being fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby enters the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and incorporates
herein by reference its Memorandum Decision dated April 12, 1996:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In

1887,

Thomas

and

Emma

Featherstone

deeded

approximately 84 acres of real estate in American Fork, Utah to

Andrew P u l l e y , father of Defendant Mary P u l l e y .

The property i s

more p a r t i c u l a r l y described a s :
Begin at the center of S e c t i o n 18, T. 5, S.R. 2. E. then
running West 32.72 chains, t h e n North 16.00 chains, then West
7.28 chains, then North 10.00 c h a i n s then East 25.00 chains,
t h e n South 6.50 chains, t h e n East 15.00 chains, then South
20.00 chains to the place of b e g i n n i n g . Area 85 acres and 40
rods of land. All in t h i s N.W. 1/4 and Lots 2, Section 18, T.
5, S.R. 2. E. Salt Lake Meridian United States Survey, Utah
County, Territory of Utah.
( H e r e i n a f t e r referred to as "the Andrew P u l l e y property.")
2.
his

In 1934, Andrew Pulley deeded approximately one acre of

land t o his son, Adolphus

Pulley.

The one acre i s more

p a r t i c u l a r l y described a s :
Beginning 16.50 chains North of t h e Southwest corner of t h e
Northwest quarter of S e c t i o n 18, Township 5 South, Range 2
East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 2.50
c h a i n s East 4.00 chains; t h e n c e South 2.50 chains; thence West
4.00 chains to the place of b e g i n n i n g . Area 1.0 acres
( H e r e i n a f t e r referred to as "the P l a i n t i f f ' s
3.

property.")

The approximate one a c r e p a r c e l deeded to Adolphus Pulley

from Andrew Pulley i s the same p a r c e l which i s presently owned by
Plaintiff.
4.

The property immediately n o r t h of and adjacent t o t h e

P l a i n t i f f ' s property remained p a r t of t h e o r i g i n a l Andrew Pulley
p r o p e r t y a f t e r Andrew Pulley deeded t h e one a c r e parcel to Adolphus
Pulley.
5.

In 1946, Andrew Pulley deeded approximately 75.85 a c r e s

of h i s p r o p e r t y to his daughter, Defendant Mary Pulley, which was
2

nQin

more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at the center of Section 18, Township 5 South, Range
2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence West 27.15 chains;
thence North 33 1' East 12.58 chains; thence South 85 56' West
6.18 chains; thence North 4.58 chains; thence West 3.28
chains; thence North 2.50 chains; thence West 4.00 chains;
thence North 7.00 chains; thence East 25.00 chains; thence
South 6.50 chains; thence East 15.00 chains; thence South
20.00 chains to place of beginning. Area 75.85 acres more or
less.
(Hereinafter referred to as "the Defendant's property.")
6.

Part of Defendant's 75.85 acre property was immediately

north of and adjacent to Plaintiff's property.
7.

In the 1940s, trees and bushes were planted and a fence

erected along the tree and bush line between Plaintiff's and
Defendant's properties.

The fence/tree line marked the boundary

line between the Plaintiff's property

on the north and the

Defendant's property on the south.
8.

From at least 1946 to 1979--some 33 years--Adolphus

Pulley and each succeeding owner of the Plaintiff's property from
Adolphus

Pulley

to

Charles

and

Xenna

Boyer

considered

and

acquiesced to the fence/tree line as the boundary line between the
Plaintiff's and the Defendant's properties.
9.

From at least 1946 to 1979--some 33 years--Defendant Mary

Pulley considered and acquiesced to the fence/tree line as the
boundary

line

between

the

Plaintiff's

and

the

Defendant's

properties.
10.

From 1946 to present, Defendant Mary Pulley has occupied,
3

possessed, maintained and cared for the property immediately north
of the fence/tree line.
11.

From 1946 to present, Defendant Mary Pulley has used the

property immediately north of the fence/tree line for family and
community events.
12.

For at least 33 years prior to Plaintiff's ownership of

her property, the fence/tree line established the boundary line
between the parties' properties.
13.

The fence/tree line between the parties' properties has

been clearly visible since at least 1946.
14.
purchased

On March 19, 1979, the Plaintiff and Roderick McCrimmon
from Charles and Xenna

Boyer

the one acre parcel

originally owned by Adolphus Pulley and identified herein as the
Plaintiff's property.
15.

On May 23, 1979, Roderick McCrimmon deeded his interest

in the Plaintiff's property to the Plaintiff.
16.

On March 19, 1979 or sometime thereafter, Plaintiff came

to believe that her one acre property extended "twenty plus" feet
to

the north of the fence/tree

line between Plaintiff's and

Defendant' s properties.
17.

The legal description of Plaintiff's property places her

northern boundary line approximately 43 feet immediately to the
north of the fence/tree line between Plaintiff's and Defendant's
properties.
4

18.

A comparison of the legal descriptions of Plaintiff's and

Defendant's

properties

shows

that

the

respective

deeds

unintentionally created a narrow description gap between the
parties' properties to the north and east of the Plaintiff's
property.
19.
different

The parties' legal descriptions were created from two
marker points

of

beginning

which

resulted

in the

description gap.
20.

The narrow strip of land creating the description gap

between the parties' properties was an unintentional and mistaken
result of the property description process.
21.

Although surveys and legal descriptions show a gap

between the parties' properties, the gap was originally part of the
Andrew

Pulley property which was

subsequently transferred to

Defendant Mary Pulley.
22.

Upon Andrew Pulley's transfer to Defendant Mary Pulley of

his property, Adolphus and his sister Defendant Mary Pulley became
adjoining landowners on the north side of Plaintiff's property.
23.

Plaintiff's property and Defendant's property have been

adjoining and are adjoining lots from 193 6 to present.
24.

No evidence was presented

showing

that any of the

Defendants committed any act of trespass against the Plaintiff.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court concludes, as a matter of law, that under the
5

doctrine

of

boundary

by

acquiescence,

property

rights

are

determined based upon actual possession of land.
2.

The Court concludes, as a matter of law, that Defendant

Pulley must prove boundary by

acquiescence by showing:

(1)

occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences or
buildings; (2) mutual acquiescence to the line as a boundary; (3)
for a long period of time, generally not less than 20 years; (4) by
adjoining land owners.
3.

The Court concludes, as si matter of law, that once

Defendant Mary Pulley has established each element of boundary by
acquiescence then she is entitled to a presumption of ownership.
4.

Defendant Mary Pulley has, as a matter of law, proven and

established her (1) occupation of the disputed property up to a
visible

line marked by

fence,

trees

and

bushes;

(2) mutual

acquiescence to the line as a boundary by all property owners from
at least 1946 to 1979; (3) for at least 33 years; (4) by adjoining
land owners.
5.

From 1946 to present, the Defendant Mary Pulley has

occupied the disputed area up to a line marked by trees, bushes and
fence.
6.

From at least 1946 to 1979--some 33 years—the owners of

Plaintiff's property and Defendant's property mutually agreed that
the

fence/tree

line was

the

boundary

line between the

two

properties.
6

nQnc

7.

The narrow strip of land shown as a description gap

between the parties' property was an unintentional and mistaken
result of the property description process.
8.

Plaintiff's property and Defendant's property have been

and are adjoining parcels of property from 1934 to present.
9.

The property extending south to the fence/tree line on

the northern side of Plaintiff's property, including the narrow
strip of property shown as a description gap, shall be quieted in
favor of Defendant Mary Pulley.
10.

The Plaintiff's deed and the Defendant's deed shall be

reformed to conform with the existing fence/tree line.
11.

Defendant Mary Pulley's deed shall be reformed to conform

with the existing configuration of the property on which she
resides, occupies and maintains, according to the fence line
surrounding her property, specifically, the trees, bushes, and
fencing bordering her property to the south shall be the southern
boundary line of her property.
12.
existing

Plaintiff's deed shall be reformed to conform with the
configuration of the property

on which she resides

according to the fence line surrounding her property, specifically,
the trees, bushes, and fencing bordering her property to the north
shall be the northern boundary line of her property.
13.

None of the Defendants committed any trespass against

Plaintiff.
7

14

The Plaintiff i s not e n t i t l e d t o damages for trespass.

15

Each party shall bear t h e i r own attorneys' fees

and

costs.
DATED t h i s pL}

day of

^%%,

996,

BY

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Thomas L. Low

8

0304

HAND-DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to the following this

/

day of May, 1996:

Thomas L. Low
3507 N. University Avenue
Suite 370
Provo, Utah 84604
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM DECISION

CHRISTINA R STOKES,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 940400337
DATE: April 12, 1996

v.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
LAW CLERK: Larry Meyers

MARY J. PULLEY,
Defendant.

DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

This matter came before the Court for a nonjury trial on March 21, 1996. The
Plaintiff was present and represented by Thomas L. Low. The Defendant was present and
represented by McKay Stirland. Having heard the evidence and counsels' arguments, the
Court hereby rules as follows.
Factual Background
The parties in this case are neighbors, residing to the east of 4800 West in American
Fork, Utah County, Utah. The Plaintiff has brought this action to quiet title to a section of
real property along a boundary of the parties1 properties.
In 1887, Thomas and Emma Featherstone deeded approximately 84 acres of real estate
in American Fork, Utah, to Andrew Pulley. In 1935, Andrew Pulley deeded approximately
one acre of his land [hereinafter referred to as "the Plaintiffs propertyM] to his son, Adolphus
Pulley. In 1946, Andrew Pulley deeded approximately 75.85 acres of his land [hereinafter
referred to as "the Defendant's property"] to his daughter, the Defendant in this case. The
Defendant's property lies to the north and to the east of the Plaintiffs property. The disputed
boundary is the northern line of the Plaintiffs property.
At some point during the 1940s, trees and bushes were planted, and a fence was
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erected along the tree line, to mark the boundary line between the Plaintiffs property on the
north and the Defendant's property on the south. From then until 1979, each succeeding
owner of the Plaintiffs property-from Adolphus Pulley to Charles and Xenna Boyerconsidered the fence/tree line to be the boundary between the two lots. And from 1946 to the
present, the Defendant has maintained and cared for the property to the north of the tree\fence
line. She has also used that area for family and community events.
On March 19, 1979, the Plaintiff and Roderick McCrimmon purchased from the
Boyers the one acre lot that had originally belonged to Adolphus Pulley. At that time or at
some later date, the Plaintiff came to believe that her property extended "twenty plus" feet
north of the tree\fence line. On May 23, 1979, Mr. McCrimmon deeded his interest in the
property to the Plaintiff.
Supporting the Plaintiffs belief that her property extends beyond the tree\fence line is
the fact that the legal description of the Plaintiffs property places her northern boundary
approximately 43 feet to the north of the tree\fence line. Adding to the confusion, a
comparison of the legal descriptions of the parties1 properties shows that the respective deeds
unintentionally created a narrow strip of land dividing the parties1 properties on the north and
east of the Plaintiffs property. The discrepancy was caused because the two legal
descriptions were created beginning at two different marker points.
The Plaintiff asks the Court to quiet title to a 43-foot-wide strip of property north of
the tree\fence line in her favor. The Plaintiff also requests damages for a tree in the disputed
area which, after being toppled by a microburst wind, was allegedly cut up and hauled away
by the Defendant and the co-defendants in this case.
The Defendant responds that the Court should quiet title, under the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence, by declaring the tree\fence line to be the southern boundary of that
portion of her property which is contingent to the Plaintiffs property.
Opinion of the Court
Under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, property rights are determined based

on actual possession of land. Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co., 29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d
145, 147 (1973). The party seeking to prove boundary by acquiescence must show: (1)
occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences or buildings; (2) mutual
acquiescence to the line as a boundary; (3) for a long period of time, generally not less than
20 years; (4) by adjoining landowners. Stoker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1990);
Englert v. Zone, 848 P.2d 165, 168 (Utah App. 1993). Once that party has established each
element, the party is entitled to a presumption of ownership. Englert, 848 P.2d at 169; Fuoco
v. Williams, All P.2d 944, 946 (Utah 1966).
The Court finds that the Defendant has shown boundary by acquiescence. From 1946
until the present, the Defendant occupied the disputed area up to the line marked by the trees,
bushes, and fence. From at least 1946 to 1979—some 33 years—the owners of the two lots
mutually agreed that the tree\fence line was the boundary. Finally, as the Court finds that the
creation of a narrow strip of land between the two properties was an unintentional and
mistaken result of the property description process, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs
property and the Defendant's property have been and are adjoining lots. Cf Affleck v.
Morgan, 12 Utah 2d 200, 203-04 (Utah 1961) ("When a section line is discovered to be in
error it does not mean that the landowners must readjust their property lines to conform to the
resurvey.").
Based on the Defendant's showing, the Court hereby quiets title in favor of the
Defendant by holding that the Defendant's property extends south to the tree/fence line on the
northern side of the Plaintiffs property. The Defendant's and Plaintiffs deeds shall be
reformed to conform with the existing tree/fence line. The Court further holds that the
Plaintiff is not entitled to damages for trespass. Each party is to bear its own attorney's fees.
Order
Counsel for the Defendant is to prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an
order of Judgment within 15 days of this decision consistent with and in support of the terms
of this memorandum and submit those documents to opposing counsel for approval as to form

prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no effect until
such are signed by the Court.

Dated this 12th day of April, 1996.

cc:

T. McKay Stirland, Esq.
Thomas L. Low, Esq.

